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KEEPING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
RELEVANT 
J.B. RUHL† 
ABSTRACT 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) has long been the workhorse 
of species protection in contexts for which a species-specific approach 
can effectively be employed to address discrete human-induced threats 
that have straightforward causal connections to the decline of a species, 
such as clearing of occupied habitat for development or damming of a 
river.  Its resounding success there, however, has led to the 
misperception that it can duplicate that record anywhere and for any 
reason a species is at risk.  Yet, is the statute adaptable to the sprawling, 
sometimes global, phenomena that are wearing down our 
environmental fabric on landscape scales through complex causal 
mechanisms?  For example, can the ESA effectively be used to combat 
climate change by regulating greenhouse gas emissions, to combat the 
impacts of urbanization by mandating green buildings, or to mitigate 
ecological degradation by demanding that resource users take into 
account the values of natural capital and ecosystem services?  This 
article suggests that it would be unwise to push the ESA in that 
direction, but that the ESA nonetheless has a supporting role to play in 
the development of policies designed to address those problems.  In 
particular, the ESA should be focused toward consolidating its core 
power to arrest the conversion of intact habitat to urban land uses, and 
from there it should be used to leverage its habitat protection function 
to promote policies responding to climate change, urban impacts, 
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ecological degradation, and other ecological problems characterized by 
complex, large-scale, indirect causal mechanisms. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
At a time when climate change, the impacts of expanding 
urbanization, and the deterioration of ecological systems threaten to 
push an ever-growing number of species into dire conditions,1 it may 
seem preposterous to suggest, as the title of this article does, that the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA)2 could be in danger of becoming 
irrelevant.  But the question is not whether a policy aimed toward 
managing the species imperilment problem is relevant—it appears we 
will need one in the Obama Administration and well into the 
future3—but rather, whether the ESA in particular is well-positioned 
 
 1. See, e.g., Stuart Pimm et al., Human Impacts on the Rates of Recent, Past, and Future 
Bird Extinctions, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 10941, 10941 (2006) (stating that, based on 
historical trends, at least twelve percent of bird species in North America will become extinct in 
the twenty-first century); Anthony Ricciardi & Joseph B. Rasmussen, Extinction Rates of North 
American Freshwater Fauna, 13 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1220, 1220 (1999) (predicting a four 
percent future extinction rate per year for freshwater fauna, which is five times higher than for 
terrestrial fauna). 
 2. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2006).  This article is not 
intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the ESA.  Rather, it focuses on suggesting 
broad themes for implementing the statute in the new Administration.  For comprehensive 
treatments of the ESA, several of which are referred to frequently infra, see generally MICHAEL 
J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (3d ed. 
1997); ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES (Donald C. Baur & 
Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2002) [hereinafter LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES]; LAWRENCE R. 
LIEBESMAN & RAFE PETERSEN, ENDANGERED SPECIES DESKBOOK (2003); STANFORD 
ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001); TONY A. SULLINS, ESA: 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001); THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: RENEWING 
THE CONSERVATION PROMISE (Dale D. Goble et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY]. 
 3. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., General Statistics for Endangered Species, http:// 
ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/TessStatReport (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).  There are 612 animal 
species and 746 plant species with at least part of their range in the United States listed under 
the ESA as threatened or endangered.  Id.  This number is not expected to fall any time soon, as 
climate change has been described as “a major threat to the survival of species and integrity of 
ecosystems world-wide.”  Philip E. Hulme, Adapting to Climate Change: Is There Scope for 
Ecological Management in the Face of a Global Threat?, 42 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 784, 784 
(2005).  In its 2007 Synthesis Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts 
that “[t]here is medium confidence that approximately 20 to 30% of species assessed so far are 
likely to be at increased risk of extinction if increases in global average warming exceed 1.5 to 
2.5°C (relative to 1980–1999),” and that if warming “exceeds about 3.5°C, model projections 
suggest significant extinctions (40 to 70% species assessed) around the globe.”  
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS 
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to address the collection of social, economic, and environmental 
problems that seem most likely to present problems for species in the 
foreseeable future.  The ESA has long been the workhorse of species 
protection in contexts for which a species-specific approach can 
effectively be employed to address discrete human-induced threats 
that have straightforward causal connections to the decline of a 
species, such as clearing of occupied habitat for development or 
damming of a river.4  Yet, is the statute adaptable to the sprawling, 
sometimes global, phenomena that are wearing down our 
environmental fabric on landscape scales through complex causal 
mechanisms?  Many seem to hope so,5 but I have my doubts about 
whether trying to move in this direction makes the best use of the 
ESA in the long run. 
Consider, for example, three policy trends that have taken center 
stage as offering traction on the problem set just described: (1) 
greenhouse gas emission regulation to respond to climate change,6 (2) 
the promotion of green building design to respond to the impacts of 
urban development,7 and (3) the integration of ecosystem service and 
 
REPORT 13–14 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ ar4_ 
syr_spm.pdf. 
 4. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Managing the Working Landscape, in THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY, supra note 2, at 101, 104 (“[ESA enforcement] has had 
the greatest impact on active changes in species habitat (e.g., the construction of new 
subdivisions, timber harvesting, and water diversions) . . . .”). 
 5. See, e.g., ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., USE OF THE POLAR BEAR 
LISTING TO FORCE REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
5–6 (2008), available at http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/08-Sept/RS22906.pdf (discussing the 
Center for Biological Diversity’s campaign to address climate change issues through the 
Endangered Species Act); Brenden R. Cummings & Kassie R. Siegel, Ursus maritimus: Polar 
Bears on Thin Ice, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3, 3 (2007) (explaining their vision of the legal 
consequences of their petition for polar bear listing). 
 6. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (requiring the Environmental 
Protection Agency to determine the efficacy of greenhouse gas emission regulation under the 
Clean Air Act).  For summaries of proposed and adopted federal, state, and local climate 
change measures, which is a fast-moving area of developments, see J.R. DeShazo & Jody 
Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1499, 1521–30 (2007); David R. Hodas, State Initiatives, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE & 
U.S. LAW 343, 343–69 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007); Stephen C. Jones & Paul R. McIntyre, 
Filling the Vacuum: State and Regional Climate Change Initiatives, 38 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1640 
passim (2007); PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, A LOOK AT EMISSIONS 
TARGETS, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/targets (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). 
 7. I use the term “green building” to refer to the practice of designing, constructing, and 
operating buildings with greater attention to energy efficiency, water use efficiency, waste 
reduction, toxics reduction, and use of recycled and other resource-efficient construction 
materials.  See U.S. EPA, Green Building, http://www.epa.gov/greenbuilding (last visited Mar. 7, 
2009).  The foremost compilation of green building techniques has come through the industry-
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natural capital values into environmental decision-making to respond 
to unsustainable ecological resource uses.8  Because the problems that 
have motivated these policy trends present clear and substantial 
threats to species,9 one might reasonably assume that the ESA could 
be aggressively employed to put these policies into motion.  But that 
is not nearly as firm a case as it may seem.  This article explores why, 
and offers an alternative strategy for the Obama Administration’s 
ESA implementation. 
Part II of the article identifies the practical limits the ESA faces 
when its impressive regulatory power10 is aimed at problems like 
 
led Leadership Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Green Building Rating System.  See 
U.S. Green Bldg. Council, LEED, http://www.usgbc.org/leed.  The LEED initiative has 
produced a series of rating systems for awarding “points” to buildings based on defined 
attributes, such as building materials, siting, and energy efficient building techniques.  See, e.g., 
U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, LEED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION & MAJOR RENOVATIONS 
(2005), available at www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=1095 [hereinafter LEED FOR 
NEW CONSTRUCTION].  There is also a growing movement to adopt green building codes to 
integrate these techniques into state and local development regulations.  See Sara Bronin, The 
Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 231, 231–34, 240–48 (2008); Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Incentives to Promote 
Sustainable Construction and Green Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More State 
Land Use Policy Initiatives, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 731, 732 (2008); LES LO BAUGH, LEED 
Green Building Incentives, in GREEN REAL ESTATE SUMMIT 2008: WHAT ATTORNEYS, 
DEVELOPERS, BANKERS AND REGULATORS NEED TO KNOW 79 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 2008) 
(providing a survey of federal, state, and local green building incentives and requirements).  For 
purposes of this article, I am not addressing the related practice of “green infrastructure,” which 
eschews traditional “hard infrastructure” installed to support urban development—such as 
curbs, gutters, and impervious drains—and prefers alternatives such as grassy swales, vegetative 
buffers, and permeable pavements.  See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MANAGING 
WET WEATHER WITH GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE: ACTION STRATEGY 2008 (2008), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/gi-action-strategy.pdf; U.S. EPA, Basic Information: Green 
Communities, http://www.epa.gov/greenkit/basicinformation.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). 
 8. Ecosystem services are the economically valuable benefits humans derive from 
ecological resources directly, such as storm surge mitigation provided by coastal dunes and 
marshes, and indirectly, such as nutrient cycling that supports crop production.  NATURE’S 
SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 3–5 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 
1997).  Natural capital consists of the ecological resources that produce these service values, 
such as forests, riparian habitat, and wetlands.  Id. at 13.  For the seminal discussion, see id.  For 
more extensive examinations of the status and future of ecosystem services and natural capital 
in law and legal scholarship, see J.B. RUHL, STEVEN KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER LANT, THE LAW 
AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2007); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and 
Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157 (2007). 
 9. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3, at 13. 
 10. The ESA has been referred to as the “pit bull” of environmental laws.  See, e.g., Steven 
P. Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes to School, 15 ENVTL. F. 55, 55 (1998) (discussing the origins of this 
reputation).  For additional historical context highlighting the Act’s “overbearing statutory 
certainty,” see Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, The Pronounced Presence and 
Insistent Issues of the ESA, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 59 (2001). 
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climate change, urbanization, and ecological fragmentation.  As 
powerful as it is when applied to acts that directly degrade intact 
habitat, it becomes unwieldy and ineffective when causal mechanisms 
are indirect (as in greenhouse gas emissions), not generally associated 
with federal agency funding or authorization actions (as in green 
building), or not generally associated with ecosystem attributes that 
support species well-being (as in managing for ecosystem services). 
Part III of the article argues that the structural constraints 
described in Part II serve a salutary purpose.  The ESA has been a 
success story in federal environmental law for contexts in which 
habitat condition is closely linked to species condition and the cause 
of habitat degradation is direct and easily identified.11  Its resounding 
success there,12 however, has led to the misperception that it can 
duplicate that record anywhere and for any reason a species is at risk.  
But the agencies delegated to administer the ESA, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS),13 cannot so easily flex the ESA to reach emerging policy 
realms like greenhouse gas emissions regulation.  Rather, unlike the 
congressional design of the Clean Air Act,14 which the Supreme Court 
recently described as built around the flexibility needed to broaden its 
regulatory scope to accommodate new threats like climate change,15 
the congressional design of the ESA is better understood as to keep it 
powerful but narrow in scope.  That trade-off might keep the ESA 
from addressing every source of stress affecting species, but it also 
keeps the statute robust and durable for addressing a particular 
category of stress—the conversion of intact habitat to other uses—
more effectively than any other environmental law has accomplished. 
 
 11. See J. Michael Scott et al., By the Numbers, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT 
THIRTY, supra note 2, at 16, 29–32.  While few species identified for protection under the ESA 
have recovered to full health, the habitat conservation effects of the statute are credited with 
preventing the vast majority of such species from ultimate extinction.  Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2008).  The FWS administers the ESA for all terrestrial, 
freshwater, and certain other specified species, and the NMFS (also known as NOAA-Fisheries) 
administers the ESA for most marine species and anadromous fish.  See id. 
 14. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000). 
 15. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007).  In Massachusetts v. EPA, the 
majority explained that  
[w]hile the Congresses that drafted [the Clean Air Act] might not have appreciated the 
possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming, they did understand 
that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments 
would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete.  The broad language . . . reflects an 
intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence.  
 Id. 
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Extending from that theme, Part IV argues that the FWS and 
NMFS should not attempt to push the ESA into taking a leading role 
in effectuating policy themes like greenhouse gas mitigation, green 
building, and ecosystem service valuation.  Rather, the agencies 
should consolidate the ESA’s power into doing what it does best—
protecting habitat for species.  This is not to say that the ESA has no 
role in the development of policy regarding climate change, green 
building, or ecosystem services.  Rather, creative consolidation and 
leveraging of the ESA’s habitat protection power could support the 
formulation of effective measures for pursuing those and similar 
policy objectives.  Ultimately, however, to keep the ESA relevant, the 
Obama Administration must keep its eye on habitat. 
II.  THE PRACTICAL BOUNDARIES OF ESA REGULATORY POWER 
The central purpose of the ESA is to “provide a means whereby 
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened 
species depend may be conserved.”16  The FWS and NMFS administer 
several core programs aimed toward that objective: 
 The Listing Programs: Section 4 authorizes the agencies 
to identify “endangered” and “threatened” species,17 
known as the listing function,18 and then to designate 
“critical habitat”19 and develop “recovery plans”20 for 
these species. 
 Interagency Consultation and the Jeopardy Prohibition: 
Section 7 requires all federal agencies to “consult” with 
the FWS or NMFS (depending on the species) to ensure 
that actions they carry out, fund, or authorize do not 
 
 16. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006). 
 17. Id. § 1532(6), (20). 
 18. Id. § 1522(a)(1).  For a description of the listing process, see generally LIEBESMAN & 
PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 15–20; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 2, at 38–58; 
SULLINS, supra note 2, at 11–25; J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of the ESA: The Keystone of Species 
Protection Law, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 19, 19–33. 
 19. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3).  For a description of the critical habitat designation process, see 
generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 20–24; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, 
supra note 2, at 59–69; SULLINS, supra note 2, at 26–28; Federico Cheever, Endangered Species 
Act: Critical Habitat, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 47; Murray D. 
Feldman & Michael J. Brennan, The Growing Importance of Critical Habitat for Species 
Conservation, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 88 passim (2001). 
 20. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f).  For a description of the recovery plan process, see generally 
LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 24–26; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 2, 
at 71–77; SULLINS, supra note 2, at 34–37; John M. Volkman, Recovery Planning, in LAW, 
POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 71. 
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“jeopardize” the continued existence of listed species or 
“adversely modify” their critical habitat.21 
 The Take Prohibition: Section 9 requires that all persons, 
including all private and public entities subject to federal 
jurisdiction, avoid committing “take” of listed species of 
fish and wildlife.22 
 Incidental Take Authorizations: Sections 7 (for federal 
agency actions)23 and 10 (for actions not subject to section 
7)24 establish a procedure and criteria for the FWS and 
NMFS to approve “incidental take” of listed species.25 
These programs generate the regulatory firepower needed to 
intervene in several categories of environmental change that cause 
species decline: “(A) the present or threatened destruction, 
modification, or curtailment of . . . habitat . . . ; (B) overutilization for 
commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C) 
disease or predation; . . . [and,] (E) other natural or manmade 
factors . . . .”26  Of course, this authority is only useful in circumstances 
where intervention is feasible and to the extent it is effective.  For 
example, habitat loss, the leading cause of species decline,27 is often 
the result of easily identifiable human-induced factors susceptible to 
 
 21. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).  For a description of the interagency consultation process, see 
generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 27–39; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, 
supra note 2, at 83–103; SULLINS, supra note 2, at 59–86; Marilyn Averill, Protecting Species 
Through Interagency Cooperation, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 87. 
 22. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).  For a description of the cases developing the legal standards for 
what constitutes “take,” see generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 39–46; 
STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 2, at 104–12; SULLINS, supra note 2, at 44–54; Alan 
M. Glen & Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity and Degree, 16 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 65 passim (2001); Gina Guy, Take Prohibitions and Section 9, in 
LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 191; Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. 
Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities “Take” Listed Wildlife under ESA Section 9 and the 
“Harm” Regulation?, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 207. 
 23. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). 
 24. Id. § 1539(a)(1). 
 25. “Incidental take,” although not explicitly defined in a specific statutory provision, is 
described in section 10 of the statute as take that is “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the 
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”  Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).  The FWS, for example, has 
adopted this meaning in regulations implementing section 7’s incidental take authorization.  50 
C.F.R. § 402.02 (2008).  For a description of the incidental take authorization procedures, see 
generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 46–50; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, 
supra note 2, at 127–73; SULLINS, supra note 2, at 87–102. 
 26. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A)–(E).  These are the factors upon which listing decisions are 
made. 
 27. See David Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United States, 
48 BIOSCIENCE 607, 609, 609 tbl.2 (1998). 
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discrete and effective regulation.28  By contrast, invasive species, the 
runner-up in causes of species decline,29 typically present exceedingly 
complex causes and solutions,30 meaning that there is usually no 
identifiable regulatory target.  As a practical matter, three 
circumstances largely define this divide between when the ESA is at 
its most and least effective: (1) the nature of the causal mechanism 
leading to species decline, (2) the degree of federal presence in that 
causal mechanism, and (3) the closeness of match between the ESA’s 
species-specific focus and the ecosystem management policy 
objective. 
A.  Causal Mechanisms 
The two regulatory arms of the ESA, the take prohibition and 
the jeopardy prohibition, are limited in scope by demanding burdens 
of proof that place tremendous stress on the statute when the cause of 
a species’ decline involves indirect, diffuse, or cumulative 
mechanisms.31  The take prohibition, for example, instructs that “with 
respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife . . . it is unlawful 
for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to . . . 
take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of 
the United States.”32  This broad prohibition applies to all federal, 
state, and local governments and all private organizations and 
individuals,33 anywhere “within the United States,” on public and 
private lands alike.  And through the statutory definition of “take,” it 
applies to any acts that “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, 
kill, trap, capture, or collect” the protected species.34  From that list of 
prohibited activities, moreover, the FWS and NMFS have by 
 
 28. Indeed, this is the source of the statute’s “pit bull” status and largely the reason it is so 
controversial—discrete actions directly impairing habitat of protected species make for easy 
targets of ESA regulation.  See Glen & Douglas, supra note 22, at 68 (discussing the proof and 
causation requirements necessary to demonstrate harm). 
 29. See Wilcove et al., supra note 27, at 609, 609 tbl.2. 
 30. See Peter M. Vitousek et al., Biological Invasions as Global Environmental Change, 84 
AM. SCIENTIST 468, 472–77 (1996).  For a series of articles covering the invasive species issue 
comprehensively, see generally Special Section: Population Biology of Invasive Species, 17 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 24–92 (Fred W. Allendorf & Laura Lundquist eds., 2003). 
 31. I have explored this feature of the ESA in connection specifically with greenhouse gas 
emissions in J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the 
No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 39–49 (2008), from which the discussion in this article is 
adapted. 
 32. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1), (a)(1)(B) (2006). 
 33. All of these entities fit the ESA’s definition of “person.”  See id. § 1532(13). 
 34. Id. § 1532(19). 
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regulation defined “harm” to include any modification of the species’ 
habitat that “actually kills or injures” individuals of the species “by 
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns.”35 
Although the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
regulatory definition of “harm” in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon,36 the Court placed significant brakes 
on the prosecution of take claims in indirect causation scenarios.  The 
harm definition extends the take prohibition from cases in which the 
action causes direct death or injury (e.g., hunting, shooting, and 
trapping), to cases in which causality is indirect—i.e., loss of habitat 
that leads in some way to actual death or injury.  However, theories 
of indirect take can become quite attenuated and speculative.37  The 
Court, in Sweet Home, found it appropriate in such cases to impose 
the burden of proof on the proponent of the indirect harm theory.  
Thus, the majority emphasized that the harm rule incorporates “but 
for” causation, with “every term in the regulation’s definition of 
‘harm’ . . . subservient to the phrase ‘an act which actually kills or 
injures wildlife.’”38  Furthermore, the term should “be read to 
incorporate ordinary requirements of proximate causation and 
foreseeability.”39  Since the Court established these tort-like 
evidentiary burdens, the lower courts have steadfastly refused to 
enforce the take prohibition based on attenuated indirect take 
theories, enjoining case-specific instances of take only when death or 
injury was proven to be likely and attributable to the defendant’s 
actions.40 
 
 35. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2008) (FWS definition); id. § 222.102 (NMFS definition). 
 36. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704 (1995). 
 37. See Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424, 430–31 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (rejecting the ESA claim 
for injunctive relief against a new subdivision based on the theory that some of the home owners 
would have pet cats, some of the cats would wander into the habitat of a listed mouse, and some 
of those cats would kill some of the mice).  In the settlement of another round of litigation 
initiated following the denial of the injunction request, the developer in Morrill nonetheless 
agreed to prohibit house cats in the development.  See William H. Satterfield et al., Who’s 
Afraid of the Big Bad Beach Mouse?, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 13, 15 (1993) (citing 
Developer Agrees to Protect Beach Mice, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 19, 1993). 
 38. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700 n.13 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3). 
 39. Id. at 696–97 n.9.  In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor was more concise, limiting the 
scope of the harm rule to “significant habitat modification that causes actual, as opposed to 
hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to identifiable protected animals.”  Id. at 708–09 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 40. For a thorough survey of the post-Sweet Home cases, see Glen & Douglas, supra note 
22, at 68–69.  For contrasting views on the feasibility of prosecuting take prohibition cases 
against sources of greenhouse gas emissions, compare Ruhl, supra note 31, at 39–42 (arguing 
that the agencies should exercise prosecutorial discretion not to pursue such cases), with Sarah 
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Similarly, the jeopardy prohibition becomes difficult to apply in 
complex indirect causation scenarios.  The ESA requires that federal 
agencies ensure actions they authorize, fund, or carry out are “not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered 
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse 
modification of habitat of such species which is determined . . . to be 
critical.”41  Agency regulations define “jeopardize” as “to engage in 
an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to 
reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of 
a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or 
distribution of that species.”42  But indirect effects are defined as 
“those that are caused by the proposed action and are later in time, 
but still are reasonably certain to occur.”43 
The “reasonably certain to occur” causal burden constrains the 
use of jeopardy analysis when macro-scale theories of indirect 
causation do not translate well into evidence of micro-scale causation.  
At the macro-scale, for example, it is easy to construct a theory of 
jeopardy causation for greenhouse gas emissions: power plants and 
other federally-authorized sources emit greenhouse gases (a direct 
effect of the action), greenhouse gases are reasonably certain to warm 
the troposphere (an indirect effect of the action), a warming 
troposphere is reasonably certain to adversely alter ecological 
conditions, and it is reasonably expected that such ecological changes 
will cause some species to decline to the point of jeopardy.  At the 
micro-scale, however, it becomes difficult to tag any individual source 
of emissions as the jeopardizing agent for a species residing 
potentially thousands of miles away.44 
This is not to say that the FWS and NMFS can simply ignore the 
macro-scale effects of greenhouse gas emissions and other complex 
indirect causal agents.  They must list species as threatened or 
 
Jane Morath, The Endangered Species Act: A New Avenue for Climate Change Litigation?, 29 
PUB. LANDS & RESOURCES L. REV. 23, 35–40 (2008) (describing how section 9 could effectively 
be used to regulate emissions through court injunctions). 
 41. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). 
 42. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2008). 
 43. Id. 
 44. As the U.S. Geological Survey recently stated, “It is currently beyond the scope of 
existing science to identify a specific source of CO2 emissions and designate it as a cause of 
specific climate impacts at an exact location.”  Memorandum from Mark D. Meyers, Dir., U.S. 
Geological Survey, to Dir., Fish & Wildlife Serv., on The Challenges of Linking Carbon 
Emissions, Atmospheric Greenhouse Gas Concentrations, Global Warming, and Consequential 
Impacts 2 (May 14, 2008), available at http://www.doi.gov/issues/polar_bears/ 
challengesoflinkingcarbonemissions3.pdf. 
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endangered by the effects of climate change, invasive species, and 
similar threats.45  Moreover, they must consider macro-scale indirect 
effects when preparing recovery plans, conducting interagency 
jeopardy consultations, and reviewing incidental take permits.46  
Rather, when causal mechanisms operate primarily on the macro-
scale through indirect, diffuse, cumulative effects, applications of the 
take and jeopardy prohibitions at the micro-scale—to specific 
emission sources, buildings, or land uses—tend to stretch the 
causation analysis beyond the ESA’s comfort zone. 
B.  Federal Presence 
Even if the FWS and NMFS were to decide to aggressively use 
the jeopardy prohibition to regulate indirect causal mechanisms at 
micro-scales, notwithstanding the difficulty of satisfying burdens of 
proof, another constraint is that the prohibition applies only to 
actions federal agencies authorize, fund, or carry out.  As broad and 
deep as federal agencies have reached into the American economy 
and society, many sources of species decline remain outside the scope 
of federal agency “action,” as so defined.  General regulation of a 
field through federal standards does not trigger the need for inter-
agency consultation on non-federal actions that must comply with 
 
 45. FWS and NOAA have each listed species based on threats from climate change 
impacts.  See, e.g., Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) 
Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212 (May 15, 2008); Endangered and Threatened 
Species: Final Listing Determinations for Elkhorn Coral and Staghorn Coral, 71 Fed. Reg. 
26,852 (May 9, 2006).  For the argument that they must do so even if the ESA’s regulatory 
programs can do little about greenhouse gas emissions, see Ruhl, supra note 31, at 32–35.  
Indeed, at a press conference announcing the FWS polar bear listing, Secretary of the Interior 
Dirk Kempthorne warned that “while the legal standards under the ESA compel me to list the 
polar bear as threatened, I want to make clear that this listing will not stop global climate 
change or prevent any sea ice from melting.”  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office 
of the Sec’y, Secretary Kempthorne Announces Decision to Protect Polar Bears under 
Endangered Species Act (May 14, 2008), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/ 
08_News_Releases/080514a.html.  The Obama Administration has not changed course in this 
regard.  On May 8, 2009, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar announced the agency’s decision 
to not provide additional protections to the polar bear, proclaiming that “the Endangered 
Species Act is not the proper mechanism for controlling our nation’s carbon emissions.”  Press 
Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Salazar Retains Conservation Rule for Polar Bears 
Underlines Need for Comprehensive Energy and Climate Legislation (May 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/news/NewsReleases/showNews.cfm?newsId=20FB90B6-A188-DB01-
04788E0892D91701. 
 46. See Ruhl, supra note 31, at 37–53; see, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 
506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 369–70 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that the FWS acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously by failing to address the effects of climate change in an interagency jeopardy 
consultation). 
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those standards; rather, a federal agency must fund or authorize the 
specific non-federal action. 
For example, the construction and operation of buildings are 
significant indirect causes of ecological degradation leading to species 
decline.  Building construction consumes wood and other raw 
materials, the production of which can adversely affect ecological 
integrity, and building operations consume electricity, the production 
source of which may be emitting greenhouse gases.47  Green building 
techniques are designed to promote the use of recycled building 
products and energy efficient operations, and thus could indirectly 
promote recovery of listed species.48  Yet green building techniques 
have been formulated primarily by private organizations and codified, 
if at all, primarily by state and local governments.49  It is unlikely that 
federal agencies will ever have much to do directly with the 
authorization or funding of non-federal buildings qua buildings—land 
use regulation, including issuance of zoning and building permits, is 
traditionally the domain of state and local governments.50  While the 
federal government has exercised limited regulatory jurisdiction over 
green building design through codified standards, such as for energy 
efficiency,51 it has not ventured into promulgating comprehensive 
building permit programs of any kind, much less specifically for green 
building.52  In the absence of that federal action nexus, the FWS and 
 
 47. See U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, THE NORTH AMERICAN CARBON 
BUDGET AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GLOBAL CARBON CYCLE 6 (2007).  Electricity 
consumption by buildings, which accounts for two-thirds of all electricity consumed in North 
America, is one of the largest factors contributing to North American greenhouse gas emissions.  
See id. 
 48. I explore the intersection of the ESA and green building policy in more detail in J.B. 
Ruhl, Cities, Green Construction, and the Endangered Species Act, 27 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
(forthcoming May 2009). 
 49. See Circo, supra note 7, passim. 
 50. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 173–74 (2001) (describing the “States’ traditional and primary power over land and water 
use”). 
 51. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6832(15), 6833(a)–(b) (2006).  The Energy Policy Act of 1992 requires 
states to compare energy efficiency standards in their respective residential and commercial 
building codes to model codes, such as the Council on American Building Officials’ Model 
Energy Code, including as those codes are periodically updated.  See id. 
 52. See Bronin, supra note 7, at 246–59; Circo, supra note 7, at 771–73.  The federal 
government has actively promulgated green building standards for federal buildings.  See, e.g., 
10 C.F.R. pt. 435 (2008) (stating mandatory energy conservation standards for federal 
buildings).  The National Institute of Building Design’s Whole Building Design Guide website 
follows, among many other things, the development of federal green building mandates.  See 
Whole Building Design Guide, Federal Mandates, http://www.wbdg.org/references/ 
federal_mandates.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). 
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NMFS would be hard-pressed to use the ESA to require green 
building on the basis that it is necessary to avoid jeopardy of a 
species—the causal mechanisms are decidedly indirect to begin with 
(which also limits the reach of the take prohibition to mandate green 
building), and there is no broad federal permitting program nexus 
through which to reach green building activity in any event. 
C.  Species-Specific Context 
Ultimately, although the ESA is intended to conserve 
ecosystems, it is only the ecosystems of listed endangered and 
threatened species that the statute reaches.  Moreover, even in this 
sense, the conservation of ecosystems is incidental to the conservation 
of listed species.  Indeed, the word “ecosystem” appears only once in 
the statute, in the purpose statement, and from there the statute is 
fixated on species.  The FWS and NMFS list species, designate critical 
habitat of species, prepare species recovery plans, and take and 
jeopardy of species are prohibited.  If particular ecosystem 
management polices do not somehow tie into one of the ESA’s 
species-specific programs, the statute provides no direct basis for the 
FWS and NMFS to pursue them. 
To be sure, where species conservation demands ecosystem 
conservation, the ESA works well to serve its purpose.  But some 
policies designed to promote ecosystem conservation, such as making 
greater use of ecosystem services valuation in decision-making, have 
little to do with conservation of listed species.  At its core, the 
ecosystem services concept is anthropocentric and utilitarian.53  There 
may in some cases be a serendipitous match between ecosystem 
conservation on behalf of a listed species and ecosystem conservation 
on behalf of human ecosystem service values, but there might just as 
often be a conflict between the two, in which case the FWS and 
NMFS must keep their eyes on species conservation as the primary 
goal.  More to the point, however, is the fact that the FWS and NMFS 
cannot do anything directly under the ESA to promote sustainability 
 
 53. RUHL, KRAFT & LANT, supra note 8, at 15. 
It is important not to confuse ecosystem functions, which are ubiquitous, with 
ecosystem services, which are the consequence of only some ecosystem functions.  
The critical difference between the two, and which makes the development of 
ecosystem services policy both complicated and controversial, is that ecosystem 
services have relevance only to the extent human populations benefit from them.  
They are purely anthropocentric.   
Id. 
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of ecosystem services, or any other ecosystem management policy, if 
doing so cannot be linked to conservation of a listed species. 
III.  KEEPING THE ESA FOCUSED ON HABITAT 
So what?  So what if the ESA cannot easily be used to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions, require green building, and demand that 
ecosystem services be valued?  The likely response is that if the 
problems these policies are designed to mitigate are in fact causing 
species decline, the nation’s most powerful species conservation law 
ought to play a leading role in promoting the policies.  But this 
approach conflates the purpose of the ESA and the power of the 
ESA.  The purpose of the statute is to conserve ecosystems on which 
listed species depend for survival, but the power of the statute to do 
so is derived from the narrow focus around which it is designed. 
The ESA, perhaps to the chagrin of its most ardent supporters, is 
at bottom a harm-preventing law, not a benefit-mandating law.  
Causing take or jeopardy of species is prohibited, but promoting the 
recovery of species is nowhere required by the statute.  The courts 
have interpreted recovery plans, for example, to have no mandatory 
effect on federal agencies, much less anyone else.54  They are plans, 
and that’s it.  The criteria for issuance of incidental take permits 
require little more than that the effects of the take are minimized and 
mitigated “to the maximum extent practicable,”55 and do not require 
that the permittee provide net benefits to the species.56  Even section 
7(a)(1) of the statute, which requires federal agencies to “utilize their 
authorities . . . by carrying out programs for the conservation of 
endangered species,”57 has been interpreted by the FWS, NMFS, and 
courts to require essentially no specific affirmative efforts to promote 
 
 54. See LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 25–26; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, 
supra note 2, at 76–77. 
 55. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Norton, 306 F. Supp. 
2d 920, 928 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (agreeing with the FWS that full mitigation of take effects is not 
required if it is not practicable). 
 56. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B).  For example, incidental permits issued under section 
10(a)(1)(B) need only ensure that the permittee’s actions “will not appreciably reduce the 
likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild.”  Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv).  
Courts have declined to interpret this standard as requiring net benefits to the species.  See Ctr. 
for Biological Diversity v. FWS, 202 F. Supp. 2d 594, 624–46 (W.D. Tex. 2002). 
 57. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). 
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species recovery.58  The ESA punishes those who do bad to species, 
but does nothing to make anyone do good. 
Yet it is important to have such a law, one that calls off business-
as-usual when business-as-usual has led a species to the brink, and 
which, when that alarm is sounded, bears down on the most 
important factor—keeping intact habitat of listed species at bay from 
conversion to other land uses.  To be sure, there are many flaws in the 
way the ESA works even in this respect, but I would rather we focus 
on improving the ESA in this narrow sense than trying to use it to 
turn the FWS and NMFS into the nation’s greenhouse gas and green 
building police.  Putting aside the political cost the agencies would 
pay were they to try that, the reality is that they are simply not 
designed or equipped to do so.  The FWS and NMFS are resource 
conservation agencies, not pollution control or building design 
agencies. 
As the Supreme Court has pithily observed, “Agencies, like 
legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell 
regulatory swoop.  They instead whittle away at them over time, 
refining their approach as circumstances change and as they develop a 
more-nuanced understanding of how best to proceed.”59  The ESA 
was not designed to resolve all sources of species’ decline in “one fell 
regulatory swoop,” and the FWS and NMFS are not the only agencies 
whittling away at the large problem of ecosystem degradation.  They 
will best serve the purpose of the ESA if they focus on whittling at 
their part of the problem—conserving intact habitat—and 
coordinating with other federal, state, and local agencies about how 
doing so can contribute to the comprehensive development of climate 
change, green building, and ecosystem services policies. 
IV.  CONSOLIDATING AND LEVERAGING ESA-BASED HABITAT 
CONSERVATION 
Although the ESA is poorly-equipped, and arguably not even 
intended, to directly implement policies like greenhouse gas 
regulation, green building, and ecosystem service valuation, the 
habitat protection function of the ESA can contribute directly to the 
broader goals of such policies (responding to climate change, 
 
 58. See J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the “New” Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and 
Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies’ Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L. 
1107, 1107 (1995) (explaining the legal background of section 7(a)(1) and proposing a more 
demanding standard). 
 59. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1457 (2007) (citation omitted). 
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urbanization, and ecological degradation, respectively) and indirectly 
to their implementation.  The FWS and NMFS can promote both 
effects by consolidating the habitat protection function to identify 
direct connections between habitat conservation and climate change, 
urbanization, or ecosystem services, and then leveraging the link to 
habitat to provide additional policy support where possible. 
A.  Consolidating Habitat Conservation 
By consolidating habitat conservation, I mean aggressively using 
the habitat protection opportunities of the statute directly in support 
of the policy goals of responding to climate change, urbanization, and 
ecological degradation.  Its focus may be narrow, but the ESA is 
nonetheless equipped to directly address effects of climate change, 
urbanization, and ecological degradation through its habitat 
protection function. 
For example, the ESA authorizes the FWS and NMFS to 
designate critical habitat as including “specific areas outside the 
geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed . . ., 
upon a determination by the [FWS or NMFS] that such areas are 
essential for the conservation of the species.”60  This could provide the 
FWS and NMFS a powerful mechanism for responding aggressively 
to ecological transitions caused by climate change.  To the extent that 
models can predict with reasonable certainty where a species might 
successfully migrate to adapt to ecological changes brought about by 
climate change, a credible interpretation of the provision would allow 
the agency to “reserve” those areas through critical habitat 
designations.61  Those designations would help reduce the effects of 
human land uses in such areas, thus securing a greater chance for the 
 
 60. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 61. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for 
the Preble’s Meadow Jumping Mouse (Zapus hudsonius preblei), 68 Fed. Reg. 37,276, 37,285 
(June 23, 2003) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.40, 17.95 (2008)).  The FWS took an approach 
like this with respect to the Preble’s meadow jumping mouse, deciding to include small 
mountain streams in the species’ critical habitat, even though larger streams are more important 
to the species, on the ground that “Preble’s populations along mountain streams may be less 
subject to certain threats including . . . long-term climate change.”  Id.  On the other hand, it 
declined to do so for the Spreading navarretia plant.  A commenter suggested that the critical 
habitat should “include areas of unoccupied suitable habitat that would provide for recovery 
opportunities, including . . . migration in response to climate change,” but the agency merely 
observed that “critical habitat designations do not signal that habitat outside the designation is 
unimportant or may not be required for recovery.”  Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and 
Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for Navarretia Fossalis (Spreading Navarretia), 70 Fed. 
Reg. 60,658, 60,662 (Oct. 18, 2005) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.12, 17.96 (2008)). 
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species to withstand climate change transitions and establish a viable 
population in its new ecological home. 
Similarly, although the ESA may not be useful for controlling the 
indirect effects of urbanization, it has proven quite effective in 
promoting local jurisdictions to integrate the habitat effects of 
expanding urbanization into land use decisions.  The greenhouse gas 
emissions effect of a building’s electricity consumption may be far 
beyond the effective reach of the take and jeopardy prohibitions, but 
the habitat conversion effects of the building’s land footprint are not.  
Numerous state and local jurisdictions have entered into “regional 
habitat conservation plans,” which are essentially large-scale 
incidental take permits administered to manage ESA compliance for 
public and private land development within the jurisdiction.62  By 
promoting jurisdiction-wide attention to habitat conservation, the 
regional permitting process can lead directly to less urbanization, 
which helps reduce greenhouse gas emissions and preserve natural 
capital, and can also indirectly spur attention to land use and building 
design techniques that are compatible with reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and sustaining ecosystem services. 
B.  Leveraging Habitat Conservation 
By leveraging habitat conservation, I mean taking advantage of 
the regulatory consequences of habitat protection, once it is in place 
under the take and jeopardy prohibitions, to promote other policies 
working toward the same ends.  The point is that while the ESA may 
not be able to require reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, use of 
green building techniques, or management for ecosystem services, so 
long as the primary regulatory target of habitat protection is met, the 
ESA is by no means out of the picture for promoting these other 
policy objectives. 
For example, conservation banking—where one landowner 
voluntarily conserves habitat to “market” as “credits” to other 
landowners in need of mitigation habitat required for issuance of an 
incidental take permit—is increasingly the mitigation method of 
 
 62. See TIMOTHY BEATLY, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING: ENDANGERED SPECIES 
AND URBAN GROWTH 23–39 (1994) (providing a survey of early regional permits).  For 
contrasting views on the regional permit experience, compare Alejandro E. Camacho, Can 
Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293 
(2007) (criticizing regional permits), with Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation Plans: 
Frayed Safety Nets or Creative Partnerships?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 94 (2001) (favoring 
regional permits). 
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choice under the ESA.63  Although a habitat conservation bank may 
only market habitat credits under the ESA, it may also be able to 
market credits for carbon sequestration and ecosystem services as 
similar compliance techniques are developed in furtherance of 
climate change and ecosystem services policies.  The FWS and NMFS 
could point to this synergy as a beneficial (and potentially profitable) 
effect of engaging in habitat conservation banking. 
Other ESA actions provide opportunities for the agencies to 
highlight this kind of synergy.  When designating critical habitat for 
listed species, for example, the agencies must take into account the 
“economic impact” of extending that status to the identified area.  To 
the extent that the protected status of the critical habitat could 
enhance its capacity to provide carbon sequestration and ecosystem 
services, those benefits should enter into the economic impact 
analysis.64  Similarly, when designing recovery plans for species, the 
FWS and NMFS could point to the incidental benefits species-based 
habitat conservation provides for carbon sequestration and ecosystem 
service values, thus illustrating that the cost accounting of habitat 
conservation for species recovery purposes should recognize the 
economic benefits of these collateral effects.65  Recovery plans for 
species listed on the basis of climate-forced impacts, moreover, could 
point to the macro-scale benefits green building and greenhouse gas 
emission reductions are likely to have for the species.  Hence, once 
the FWS and NMFS have fulfilled the primary habitat protection 
 
 63. See Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Conservation Banks, 68 
Fed. Reg. 24,753 (May 8, 2003).  For an overview of ESA conservation banking policy and 
practice, see J.B. Ruhl, Alan Glen & David Hartman, A Practical Guide to Habitat Banking 
Law and Policy, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 26, 26 (2005).  Caution is required in designing 
such habitat trading programs, however, to ensure market forces do not produce unintended 
consequences, such as habitat fragmentation.  See Jamison E. Colburn, Trading Spaces: Habitat 
“Banking” under Fish & Wildlife Service Policy, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 33, 33 (2005); 
James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 607, 624–44 (2000). 
 64. Unfortunately, the agencies have steadfastly declined to take this approach when it has 
been suggested in public comments to proposed critical habitat designations, either ignoring the 
issue altogether or arguing that it is beyond the agencies’ capacity to “monetize” such benefits 
and omitting any qualitative discussion of the potential for such benefits.  See, e.g., Designation 
of Critical Habitat for Helianthus Paradoxus (Pecos Sunflower), 73 Fed. Reg. 17,762, 17,765 
(Apr. 1, 2008) (stating the agency’s inability to monetize); Revised Designation of Critical 
Habitat for the Tidewater Goby (Eucyclogobius newberryi), 73 Fed. Reg. 5,920, 5,927 (Jan. 31, 
2008) (failing to mention ecosystem services in response to public comment). 
 65. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(iii) (2006) (stating that when preparing recovery plans, 
the agencies must provide “estimates of the . . . cost to carry out those measures needed to 
achieve the plan’s goals”). 
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function of the ESA, they can put it to work in numerous ways to 
support policies outside the direct reach of the statute but consistent 
with the overall objective of species conservation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The species imperilment problem has become intractable, and 
neither the Obama, nor any future, Administration will solve it, but 
rather can hope only to manage it.  Few human activities, from 
belching power plants down to a person turning on the kitchen water 
tap, do not contribute in some degree to the problem.  The sources of 
species imperilment are ubiquitous, and imperiled species are 
ubiquitous.  This does not mean, however, that the ESA is ubiquitous.  
Those who fear for the ESA’s enduring relevance in an increasingly 
complex world of species imperilment may argue that the statute 
must be carried and applied to each and every context in which 
human activity contributes in some way to species decline, but this is 
simply impracticable and, more importantly, not the design of the 
statute. 
Rather, I have argued in this article that the ESA will be most 
effective when the FWS and NMFS use it to “whittle away” at the 
species imperilment problem by focusing the statute’s power on what 
it and the agencies are best equipped to address—arresting 
conversion of habitat to other uses.  Habitat protection on these 
grounds alone will contribute to broader policies such as responding 
to climate change, promoting green building, and valuing ecosystem 
services.  With creative use of this focused application of the statute 
and through coordination with other agencies “whittling away” at 
these problems through their respective authorities, the FWS and 
NMFS can also leverage habitat protection to further support (but 
not require) these policy goals.  In this way the ESA surely will not 
become ubiquitous, but it will remain relevant. 
 
